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　This paper examines the developments and interactions　of global imbalances　and the cur-
rent global financial crisis from the perspective of unbalanced globalization. Neoliberal globa-
lization resulted in higher income inequality in both the us and East Asia and exacerbated
global imbalances. The rising current account deficitin the us and foreign capital inflows to
the us aggravated the asset market bubble and its burst caused the global financial crisis.
Global imbalances　have been　shrinking after the crisis,however　it is stilllimited and future
prospects are uncertain. This paper argues that structural reforms of the us and East Asia
are necessary in correcting global imbalances.　Ａ reduction in excessive spending in the us
and ａ change of the growth strategy are necessary for more　balanced globalization.
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I. Introduction
　Starting from mid-2007, the global financial crisis has　engulfed　the　global economy. The
crisis occurred at the heart of the core　countries, that is the us, and spread into other
countries very fast thanks to the development of financial globalization. It hit hard almost a11
0f advanced countries and developing countries as well after Lehman's bankruptcy in Septem-
ber of 2008. Already many explanations　were presented　about　the cause　of the crisis.They
emphasize the problems of financial deregulation, too much risk-taking of financial institu-
tions　based　on wrong theoretical models, lax monetary policy leading to the real estate
market bubble, and so on. The crisis was indeed a highly complex event and the full analysis
of it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is clear that the strong belief in the free
market and benefits of financial deregulation　and globalization waned, while the Keynesian
argument for the stronger role of the government became much more popular.
　Given the　critic　againstneoliberal　financial　globalization,this　paper examines the so-called
global imbalances　as　an important background of the current financial crisis.We attempt to
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analyze how imbalances　in the global economy grew serious between the us and East Asia
and how this contributed to the us financial crisis.After the beginning of the new millen-
nium, the current account deficit of the us economy kept increasing and international capital
kept flowing from East Asian surplus countries to the us. This provided excessive liquidity
and stimulated domestic consumption　and bubbles in the us overly. Along with the crisis
and the deep recession of the us, the ｇｌｏｂａｌimbalances　appear to have been reduced.
However, there　should be concerted efforts of the us and East Asia to bring about ａ
rebalance　of the ｇｌｏｂａｌeconomy. We present future prospects and underscore the change of
the growth strategy in East Asia as　an　essential factor to this global rebalancing｡
　This paper is organized as follows. Section II investigates the current global financial crisis,
focusing on its causes and the effects on the global economy. Section Ill criticallyevaluates
the development of globalization and demonstrates the problem of global imbalances.　It also
discusses the political economy of global imbalances by indicating how diffe･rentthe effects of
similar neoliberalism were on the us and East Asia. Section IV examines the current
changes of global imbalances　after the crisis and presents future prospects. We underscore
the important role of East Asia in the rebalancing process.
n. The Global Financial Crisis after 2007
　1. The us Financial Crisis and Its Causes
　The financial crisis in the us was　ａ collapse of the new financial architecture that was
established by several measures　of financial deregulation against the backdrop of neoliberal-
ism after the 1980s (Crotty, 2009). The idea that the free financial market is always efficient
grew predominant and brought about institutional changes in the us financial markets. For
example, in 1999, the Ｕ. S･ government repealed the Glass-Steagal Act that separated opera-
tions of commercial banks and investment banks. Also, an act called the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act to introduce deregulation for all transactions including financial derivatives
was passed in the us congress in 2000.
　Along with these　rounds　of　deregulation, financial innovation encouraged the growth of
securitization of debts and financial derivatives　markets. Financial institutions started to oper-
ate　the　business　dealing with MRS (Mortgage based securities) very actively given the
bubble of the real estate market in the early 2000s. Many institutions introduced an aggres-
sive　business　strategy to sell mortgage to subprime borrowers　by providing teaser rates and
so　on. They went far to develop the more　complex securitization　scheme called ａ CDO
(Collateralized Debt Obligation) that divided debts into several groups, called tranche, and
then repacked them to sell in the financial markets. Thanks to these measures, credit rating
companies, closely related to those investment banks banks, evaluated these assets very credi-
ble, which did not reflect risk in reality. The amount of global CDO issuance　rose from
$157.4 billion in 2004 to $520.6 billion in 2006， and its market size grew more than 4 times
between 2002 and 2006， when the amount was estimated about $2 trillion.The progress of
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derivatives　market made the process much more complicated. Ａ CDS (Credit Default Swap)
was newly introduced and provided insurance　service for financial institutions that dealt with
CDOs to some extent. The size of the CDS market skyrocketed from less than S l trillion in
2001 to more than S 60 trillion in 2007 1n the whole world. Investment banks such as Lehman
Brothers actively utilized SIVs (Special Investment Vehicles) that did business　in this sector
in a huge scale, freer from financial regulation. It was called the ‘shadow banking syste?
and was indeed highly risk-taking and profitable before the collapse.
　０ｆ course, all of these developments happened together with the growing bubble in the
real estate market. In the us the price of real estate soared from 2000 to 2005 by almost 50
%, after when it started to fall sharply. The lax monetary policy by the Fed after the 2001
recession was associated with this at least in part though it must have been hard for it to
stop the bubble growing in advance. Financial institutions that dealt in mortgage-based CDOs
expected that this trend would continue without ａ significant drop of the real estate price.
However, similar to all asset market bubbles, the real estate market bubble in the us finally
began to burst starting from 2005. This made the investment bank model of Arnerican finan-
cial institutions deeply wrong, and brought about ａ sudden financial collapse along with the
default of CDOs and then that of related CDS. No financial institutions were willing to
purchase sour mortgage-based securities any longer and serious credit crunch happened in the
us financial markets from mid-2007. The us government was not so prompt in response to
the initial burst of the crisis, and the crisis peaked in September of 2008 when Lehman
Brothers, No. 4 1nvestment bank, went bankrupt. After then, large financial institutions　such
as Merrill Lynch, AIG, and Citigroup received bailout finance　or sold to other institutions
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　］.）faced with the situation ａ bankruptcy･
　The crisis, though it appears　complicated, demonstrated ａ typical cycle of ａ financial crisis
from the perspective of the growth of bubbles, overlending by financial institutions with
irrational exuberance and its collapse in the end (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). It became　only
more serious this time, which is not different from others, due to measures of financial
deregulation, the development of financial innovation and lax monetary policy. Thus, the us
financial crisis could be understood as　an institutional failure of the us financial system and
incapability of the government to monitor it. Ideological contention such as neoliberalism and
the efficient market theory to argue for the retreat of the government did play ａ crucial role.
The collapse of the us financial system finally ushered in ａ serious　reflection in economic
thoughts and ａ new consensus that financial markets are not efficient inherently and proper
government regulation　IS　crucial.
　2.　Effects on the Global Economy and Future Prospects
　The effects of the financial crisisin the us were felt by other countries gravely because
the financial markets in the world are　already globalized to ａ great extent. There are several
channels through which the us financial crisisinfluenced other countries. First, foreign finan-
cial institutions　also exposed themselves to problematic assets such as CDOs hugely as
European financial institutions reported ａ great loss because of the crisis.Second, the breakup
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of the us financial market resulted in a global drop of asset market prices including the real
estate market and the stock market in most of countries. This significantly shrank the asset
base　of financial　institutions　inforeign countries　and　again brought about credit crunch　and
turmoil in the financial markets. Third, foreign investment, particularly short-term bank lend-
ing and portfolio investment, to emerging market countries declined sharply by ‘deleveraging'
of financial institutions in advanced countries in the midst of the crisis.This dealt ａ hard
blow to countries that relied highly on foreign capital including Iceland, Ireland and others.
Finally, the crisisnaturally resulted in ａ deep ｇｌｏｂａｌrecession and reduced exports demand in
the world largely. Many expect that the world export will fall by about 10% in 2009 because
of the crisis.Countries that depended on　exports including East Asian countries would be
greatly damaged by this naturally. For example, Japan is expected to record the largest fall
of GDP in 2009， as much as 6%, in the OECD since the export decline is a huge shock to
Japan even though the loss of Japanese financial institutions because of the crisis was limited.
Recently, the IMF report estimates that the loss due to this financial crisisin all advanced
countries would be as large as ＄ 4 ｡1 trillionand that in the us would be S 2.7 trillion(IMF,
2009a). However,　some　estimate the loss to be even　more than that.
　The policy response to the crisis was ａ tremendous　expansion of liquidity by introducing
zero-percent interest policy and direct spending of public money to prop up the economy in
many countries. The us government decided to spend as much as $787 billion in early 2009
1n total to avert an economic collapse by enacting the American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 and already spent ａｂｏｕt紹00 billion this year.　The Fed also cut down interest
rates aggressively from ５｡25 ％ｉｎ early 2008 to 0 ｡25 ％in mid-2009 and provided credit
directly for financial institutions in trouble through several support programs. Other advanced
countries quickly followed the us, and ａ１１Ｇ２０nations　are in　collaboration　to　boost　the
　　　　　　　　2）global economy. Thanks to these　efforts,it is likely that the worst is now　over although
many are worried that the current crisis is the biggest one next to the Great Depression.
However, it is commonly expected that the economic recovery would be very slow and take
ａ long time despite international cooperation of many developed countries. The rnost recent
estimation for the growth rate of the global economy in 2010 1s 3.1% by the IMF and ２.4％
by UN. These　were higher than former　estimates reflecting stabilization of the global eco-
nomy, but were stillmuch lower than 5 ｡2% in 2007. There　are indeed ａ lot of problems in
the global economy including the growing fiscal deficit and government debts in many coun-
tries and disorder of the ｇｌｏｂａｌfinancial system.
　One thing very clear about this crisisis that the current financial crisis became truly global
due to the progress of financial globalization. It is also ironical that the march toward a total
financial integration of the world economy with more　economic liberalization, deregulation
and opening may be deterred by the current crisis.With respect to the current financial crisis,
we should pay attention to the other global aspect of the crisis,that is, the global imbalances
problem, another important background of the current financial meltdown. The globalization
process up to now was involved with serious contradictions including global imbalances, and
the financial crisis starting from 2007 had much to do with them. The next section will
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discuss globalization　and imbalances　of the global economy and how these　were associated
with the occurrence of the current financial crisis.
Ⅲ. Globalization, Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis
　　1. Globalization and Its Contradictions
　Globalization means　ａ development of global integration of economic　activities across　bor-
ders　of countries. It could be demonstrated by the growth of international trade and interna-
tional capital movements. Along with more　economic opening and liberalization, especially in
capital accounts, globalization developed rapidly since the 1980s in developed countries. After
then, developing countries also joined this march toward globalization together with structu-
ral adjustment programs　recommended by international　organizations, frequently　after finan-
　●　　　　　●cial crises｡
　Though many economists and policymakers stillbelieve that globalization would produce
more benefits than costs, its evidence　is not clear. It is argued that international trade should
encourage　economic growth by increasing the size of markets and productivity. Foreign
investment is also expected to enhance economic efficiency and growth by providing deficient
capital in developing countries and through spillover effects.However, empirical evidences for
these arguments are still weak. There is ａ question about growth effects of trade liberaliza-
tion policy although majority of studies support the growth effects of de facto international
tion promotes economic growth in empirical studies as　even the IMF study admits it（Ｋｏsｅ
et a1。2006）.Ｔｈｅｒｅ　are　many　reasons　why capital account liberalization　and　international
investment fail to stimulate growth. For example, financial globalization may aggravate insta-
bility of the economy and more foreign capital inflows may appreciate domestic currency,
thereby hampering economic growth (Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009）.
　Recently, more people are　concerned about how globalization affects income distribution
within countries because　income inequality rose after the 1980s in most countries. Ａ large
number of studies point to technology as its cause, which increased the premium related to
skill and education, and wage inequality in developed countries. However, it is ａｒgｕedthat
the role of international trade with developing countries and foreign investment out of de-
veloped countries could play ａ considerable role too. Developing countries also experienced
worsening of income distribution, opposite to the standard international trade theory. Many
argue that it is because the export sector with their comparative advantage uses　semi-skilled
labor that is relatively rich in developing countries, while the poor　are farmers　and non-
skilled labor. It is also related with the fact that globalization deteriorated economic instabil-
ity, leading to financial crises, which is bad to income distribution　as always.
　Therefore, current globalization has several inner　contradictions in its process. The first
contradiction is an increasing gap between rich and poor countries. The income gap among
countries became larger and what we have seen was not 'convergence' but‘divergence' ａｌｏｎｇ
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with globalization. Because the growth e伍?cts of globalization are not clear, it is understand-
able that most developing countries, except ａ few East Asian ones, failed to catch up with
developed　countries after the 1980s. Now developing countries demand fairer international
economic order as they recognized the problems of economic opening and liberalization. The
　　　　　　　　　●　　●　　　　●　　　　　　　　　　●　　　　●　　　　　　　　　　●　　　●　　　　●　　　　　　●　　●　　　　　　　　　　●second contradiction IS worsening income distribution within countries. For the reason　we
mentioned above, many studies confirm that distribution ｅ伍?cts of globalization may be nega-
tive. If income distribution becomes　so　worsened along with globalization it cannot have
domestic political support and will face more anti-globalization arguments. This may deter
the current course of globalization significantly･
　The third contradiction is rapidly growing financial instability and imbalances of the global
economy. Because of the ongoing rise in the current account deficit in the us and continuing
capital flows into the us to finance the deficit, the global economy became　very unbalanced.
The current global financial crisis is related exactly with this　feature because the asset
market bubble in the us was stimulated by foreign investment into the us considerably. The
ｇｌｏｂａｌ imbalances indeed reflect many structural problems of the current ｇｌｏｂａｌ economy and
have several explanations　as we discuss in the next section. But without the development of
globalization as　such, we would not have this huge imbalances in the global scale because　it
is globalization that made domestic imbalances　global. Furthermore, we saw　so　many finan-
cial crises in developing countries due to mismanaged financial opening and contagion ｅ伍?cts
in the globalized financial market. International capital flows, especially short-term ones, were
greatly pro-cyclical and volatile, and hence　contributed to the increase　in instability in the
current global financial system. This financial instability became more and more global due to
the close linkage of the countries in the world economy through trade and finance　as the
current crisis illustrates.
　If these　conflicts of globalization were　not addressed successfully, the future of globaliza-
tion is uncertain because　political support for it could be weakened in the future. If we take
into account of these problematic aspects of globalization, it is understandable why even
prominent economists frequently talk about ‘discontents of globalization' (Stiglitz, 2002).
　2. Global Imbalances　and International Capital Flows to the Ｕ. S.
　The global imbalances　demonstrate the precarious and unsustainable situation of the world
economy evidently. As Figure l shows, the current account deficit kept rising after ｅａｒlｙ
2000s before the current financial crisis and so did foreign capital inflows into the us eco-
nomy accordingly･
　The main reasons　for the imbalances are excessive　consumption in the Ｕ. S and the recent
fiscal deficit under the Bush administration, that is, overspending of both the private and
public sector. Figure ２ demonstrates the gap between domestic private investment and saving,
and net government saving. We can see that lower　saving than investment due to overcon-
sumption and the large government deficit contributed to the current account deficit after the
2000s, while the 1980s saw the fiscal deficit as ａ main cause of the current　account　deficit。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3)offset by the private saving-investment gap in part. These new twin deficits of the us lied at
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　　　　Figure 1. The Current Account Deficit / GDP in the us （％）
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the core　of the global imbalances.
　The surplus countries are　mainly East Asian ones such as China and some oil producers in
this recent period. These countries have pursued the export-dependent growth strategy rather
than domestic demand after the East Asian crisis in 1997. They accumulated the gigantic
amount of trade surpluses and foreign reserves, and they recycled these dollars to the Ｕ. S.
economy by purchasing the Ｕ. S. treasury bonds. For instance, the foreign reserves　of China
jumped from $212 billion to more than $1 trillionin 2006 and even more than $2 trillionin 2009.
　There　　were hot　debates　about　this　ｇｌｏｂａｌ　imbalances　problem　ａ　few　years　ago
(Eichengreen, 2006). Optimists underscored that American consumption had driven the rapid
growth of the whole world, providing markets for other　exporter countries. According to
them, global imbalances　were features of the Bretton Woods System II that could be stable
because　it was on the basis of supports from both surplus and deficit countries. Others
insisted that the global imbalances　problem was owing to ａ‘saving glut' of East Asian
countries that tried to hold a lot of foreign reserve.　These arguments tended to overempha-
size the strength of the Ｕ. S. economy and the problems outside America. They assurned that
ｇｌｏｂａｌimbalances　could continue　somehow without ａ serious instability. However, ａ large
number of rational economists presented concerns that the global imbalances were not sus-
tainable since the burden of external debts in the U. S. economy and the risk of depreciation
of the dollar to surplus countries was too high. Many scholars acknowledged that the Ｕ. S.
economy should reduce their spending and dollars should be depreciated to ａlarge extent. ０ｆ
course, the other pillar of global imbalances, East Asia, should not be neglected. Concerning
East Asia, there has been an‘investment draught', not just ａ‘saving glut'（Ｌｅｅand McKibbin,
2006）.ｌｎ fact, most East Asian countries including Korea　and the ASEAN experienced a
significant decline of the investment rate after the 1997 East Asian crisis,in part due to
structural changes of the economy together with neoliberal restructuring. China had ａ rise in
the investment rate but that of the saving rate was faster because domestic consumption was
depressed and exports were promoted actively･
　Another aspect of ｇｌｏｂａｌimbalances　is that foreign capital has moved from poorer　coun-
tries including emerging markets to the us, opposite to theoretical expectation, called the
‘Lucas　Paradox'. Neoclassical theory states that international capital should move into poorer
countries where the return to capital is relatively higher with lower physical capital per
worker. ０ｆ course, many factors including institutions, risk and financial development affect
the level of return and hence　capital may not move to poorer　countries. However, it is true
that　countries　that　are　ｒeallｙ　inneed of capital for development do not have benefits from
capital inflows　currently. Even African　countries became　net creditors because　they　should
pay back their original debts with interests. This is unfair as well as inefficientin view of the
balanced growth of the world ｅｃｏｎｏrｎｙ･
　The more　serious problem is that foreign capital flows into the us had not been utilized
by productive purposes.　They financed the serious trade and fiscal deficit of the U. S. eco-
nomy, and stimulated Americans' consumption beyond their income. They also encouraged
the growth of recent bubbles in the real estate market and the stock market at least in part.
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The debt level of the us economy rose　rapidly after ｅａｒlｙ 2000s， which had much to do
with continuous capital flows into the us economy. Thus, distorted international capital flows
in the global economy aggravated a debt-driven spending binge in the Ｕ. S. and asset market
bubbles. This suggests that the current global crisis stemmed from the imbalances　of the
global　economy and problematic international capital flows partly･
　3 .　The Political Economy of Global Imbalances　in the us and East Asia
　It should be noted that institutional and political changes both in the us and East Asia
played an interesting role in worsening global imbalances.　Neoliberalism became dominant in
both the us after the 1980s and East Asia after the 1990s but its effects on external balances
were quite different.In the us, conservative economic policy after the Reagan administration
resulted in more unequal income distribution on one hand and more financial deregulation on
the other hand. Consequentially, poor Americans turned to more and more debts even though
they did not earn income　enough, provided by financial institutions in the deregulated finan-
cial markets. Thus, they kept excessive consumption　and this enlarged the current　account
deficit　because　the saving rate went lower　continuously. After the ｅａｒlｙ2000s， even　poor
households such as subprime lenders became　able to get mortgage loans to buy houses easily･
Financial institutions introduced financial innovation in this market such as securitization and
derivatives, that is, CDO and CDS, under weak regulation using the wrong model seized by
the strong belief that the financial market is always efficient This encouraged the excessive
growth of sub-prime lending in the mortgage market and increased system risk highly, mak-
ing the whole financial system very vulnerable.
　Furthermore, cheap imports from China were necessary to the us economy as these could
check the growth of real wages, which had been in depression for long after the early 1970s.
International trade contributed to weakening workers' power and strengthening the neoliberal
accumulation regime. Foreign direct investment and the potential threats of transfer of factor-
ies out of the us, called the‘threat effects',also led to this result. In this globalized neoliber-
al accumulation regime, the us consumption was crucial because the us economy was the
biggest market for exports from other countries, where us multinational companies are
producing export goods. This suggests that neoliberalism, globalization and global imbalances
interacted closely in the us. Neoliberal changes were　intensified by globalization　and they
provided　backgrounds　for　rising　global　imbalances, while　global　imbalances　reinforced
neoliberalism in the us at the same time.
　０ｎ the contrary, neoliberalism in East Asian countries went hand in hand with the export-
dependent growth strategy as they struggled to increase exports to make use of globalization
for maximum growth∠Most East Asian countries observed that income distribution became
worse　　after　introducing　more　liberalization, opening　and economic　reforms　following
neoliberalism, same to the us. China　suffered from ａ widening income gap between the rich
and the poor for ｌｏｎｇafter the 1980s, and Japan saw income distribution worsening after the
late 1990s with neoliberal reforms. Crisis-hit countries including Korea　and Thai also went
through worse　distribution because　of neoliberal economic restructuring such as labor market
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flexibilization,pushed by the IMF, after the 1997 crisis.These countries strove to globalize
more and increase exports for economic growth and they had increasing trade surpluses after
1998 with currency depreciation　and structural changes in the economy｡
　To East Asia, workers' low wages were　requisite to export market competition that grew
intensive with more　and more　countries integrating into the world economy. Worse　distribu-
tion also repressed consumption　and domestic demand, thereby increasing trade surpluses.
Furthermore, financial restructuring toward the more liberalized and open financial markets,
from the old East Asian style relationship-based financial system, lowered corporate invest-
ment considerably. Therefore, neoliberalism and worse　income distribution in East Asia
caused a draught of investment and consumption　and the　consequent rise in the trade sur-
pluses. This suggests that similar changes in the political economy created opposite results in
the external balance　across the Ｐａ?ic,depending on the different economic growth strategy･
The development of neoliberalism ａｌｏｎｇwith globalization deteriorated global imbalances.
IV‾.　GlobalRebalancing and East Asia
　1. Changfes in Global Imbalances and the us
　After the crisis breaking out in late 2007, it appears that the serious ｇｌｏｂａｌimbalances
started to be corrected to some extent ａｌｏｎｇwith the decrease　in imports of the us economy
because of the serious economic recession. Figure ３ demonstrates the quarterly changes of the
us current account deficit.It started to shrink from 2006 and there　was　ａ signification
decrease　after late 2008. Its level in 2009 by the second quarter is the lowest in 2000s.
　The change after the global financial crisisis related with the fact that the saving rate of
the us economy rose while the investment rate fell after the beginning of 2008. The house-
hold saving rate out of disposable income continued to rise from １.2% in the first quarter of
2008 to 4.9% in the second quarter of 2009. The domestic private saving rate recorded 15.2
% higher than that of the domestic investment rate, 14.8% in 2008. This contributed to the
reduction of the trade deficit significantly.This is closely associated with the sharp fall of net
asset　value　due　to　the　financialcrisis and the stillhigh level of household debts.
　However, this change was offset by the rise in government net saving that rose up to　－4.7
％in 2008 from －1.5% in 2007. The government　balance　worsened even　more after　2008
0wing to expansive government spending in response to the financial crisis.The officialfiscal
deficit also went up to 3.2% of GDP in 2008 due to the stimulus package from 1.2% in
2007. Furthermore, the us government　announced that the fiscal deficit in 2009 fiscal year
amounted to 釘.4 trillion,three times larger than that in 2008， as high as 9 .9％ｏｆ GDP.
Household saving out of their disposable income was stillmere 2．7% in 2008，lower than the
level in 2004， which enforced debt-dependent consumption. The share　of domestic consump-
tion　out of GDP in the us was stillabout 70％，ｎｏtchanging at all from 2003， higher than
about 67% in 1998. 1n 2009， the estimate of the total domestic saving rate including the
government sector was sti114% point lower than the total investment rate, although it was
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　　　　Fiffure.　3.　The Recent Changes in the Current Account Deficit in the us （％）
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lower than the level in all years after 2003. Thus, the us should ｒelｙon foreign saving
continuously　in 2009　because　of the rise in the deficit of the government balance　in spite of
the surplus of the private balance　(ＩＭＦ，2009b).
　Besides, it is not certain whether the reduction of the current account deficit will continue
and overspending the us will finally end. The decline in consumption ｍｉｇｈtbe just tempor-
ary in the process of deleveraging of households and financial institutions in the crisis.When
the economy stabilizes and grows again, another bubble and a bubble-led boom　could stimu-
late consumption of the us economy again as the financial sector may consider that as an
opportunity for profit.In fact, the us economy appears　to begin to recover as the quarterly
growth rate compared with the previous quarter turned positive to 2.8% in the third quarter
of 2009 after recording four consecutive　negative quarterly growth rates.
　The foreign capital inflows also changed to some extent. Foreign investment into the us,
called net foreign lending, fell sharply in the recent　period　due　to　the　drop　of　thecurrent
account deficit after 2007. The negative international investment position of the us economy
did not worsen since then. There has been ａ change in the behavior of foreign central banks
that started to be concerned about the future depreciation of dollars. They attempted to
reduce dollar assets more in their foreign reserve　assets　and diversify their reserve　holdings
by increasing the portion of other currencies, especially in 2007. However, the demand for
safe assets such as the us government security became　even higher in the middle of the
financial crisis and foreign holding of these bonds rose　in 2008 significantly. Partly related to
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this, the value of dollars remained higher than the common　expectation.　It　is　not　until　late
2009 that the dollar began to depreciate considerably, reflecting the huge increase　in money
supply of the us and weakening trust in the us economy. The depreciation of dollars might
help the us to reduce the current　account　deficit　further,but　it　should　be　noted　that too
abrupt changes may bring about ａ collapse of the dollar value and ａ serious disorder of the
ｇｌｏｂａｌ　economy･
　Thus, a change in global imbalances　occurred after 2008 along with the financial crisis but
it is stilllimited. Besides, there is high uncertainty about the correction of global imbalances
in the future. It would be fair that we may not say that the recent　change　due to　the　crisis
will finally lead to ａ resolution of ｇｌｏｂａｌimbalances　because more structural transformation
of the us economy is necessary. Regarding the us economy, the interest of financial ｃａｐｉtal
is stillpowerful and it is highlｙ likely that another bubble-led boom that will induce overcon-
sumption dependent on debt will be stimulated. Finance　already became dominant in the
operation of the us economy as the share　of profits of financial institutions out of profits of
all firms in the us rose from 15.3% in 1980 to 33.3% in 2003. The share of value added of
the financial sector in GDP is relatively high by so-called the financialization process. Con-
sidering that Wall Street that has great influence in us politics shaped the political economy
and policy making in the us, ａ constant check of lending and debts and tight regulation of
financial institutions will be very hard. In particular, regulation of ａ development in new
financial products such as complex financial derivatives will be never easy. It should be noted
that there is already criticism that measures of the Obama administration to regulate the
financial sector are neither comprehensive nor　effective although the us government spent
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4）huge money to bail out financial institutions introuble.
　2. The Role of East Asia for Balanced Globalization
　It is　certain that structural　changes　in both economies across the Ｐａ?ic,not just the us,
are necessary for correcting imbalances　in the current global economy. The cause　of global
imbalances　indeed lied in other economies such as China that accumulated huge trade sur-
pluses and recycled dollars into the us. Global imbalances　will not disappear　unless those
surplus countries　strongly encourage domestic demand as　ａ　sourceof growth by changing
their growth strategy. Although the size of the current account surplus out of GDP in China
slightly fellin 2008 because　of the crisis,the level is stillmuch higher than that in the ｅａｒlｙ
2000s. The share　of exports in total GDP in China was as high as 33% in 2008， much higher
than 20.1% in 2001 and even higher than 30.7% in 2004， though it fell from 36 ｡5% in 2006.
Meanwhile, the share　of dornestic consumption out of GDP in China was　sti1136.8% in 2008，
lower than about 45% from the late 1990s to the ｅａｒlｙ2000s， and much lower than that of
other countries, let alone the us.
　As we saw, most East Asian countries pursued the export-dependent growth strategy by
increasing exports to the us. That required these　countries to ｋｅｅｐtheir currency relatively
depreciated for export promotion. For example, the Chinese　government maintained the effec-
tive peg system between the RMB and dollars until mid-2006 after which it introduced more
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flexible　exchange rate system and allowed appreciation of the RMB. However, it again peg-
ged the exchange rate of the RMB to the us dollar after mid-2008 1n order to encourage its
exports. This strategy was successful in the past but it would be harder　and harder to
succeed. It is not likely to be feasible any more due to the collapse of the us economy and
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　5）
the rising pressure from the us.
　This is why many call for a fundamental change of the growth strategy of East Asia.
These　countries should make more　efforts to encourage domestic demand and make this an
engine of growth instead of exports to the us. They need to stimulate the purchasing power
of nation people by enhancing social welfare and improving income distribution, opposite to
the strategy up to now. Appreciation of domestic currencies in East Asia could　contribute　to
this process too. To this end, the political economy in this region should change first. It is
needed　that　these　countries should end neoliberalism and introduce　more progressive　and
Keynesian economic policy based on ａ broad political coalition. The recent change of the
government in Japan to the Democratic Party that emphasizes better distribution and domes-
tic demand is meaningful in this sense. It will take more time for China to promote domestic
demand enough but the Chinese　government　appears　to recognize the serious problems of
bad income distribution. The conservative Korean　government still adheres to the neoliberal
tenet but more opposition can emerge sooner or later taking into account of the reality of bad
distribution　and poverty･
　Adjustment of exchange rates, especially between the Chinese　RMB and the us dollar
must be helpful to the resolution of imbalances directly as it will decrease　imports of the us
and increase exports of the us. But there is ａ danger of too fast and disorderly depreciation
of us dollars, which may destabilize the global economy. If it occurs, it will incur serious
cost to China　and other East Asian countries because they hold gigantic arnount of dollar
assets. In this situation called the dollar trap, an orderly and slow depreciation of dollars
would be more desirable.
　Ａ more balanced global economy could be realized only when the benefits of international
investment spread to poorer countries that did not receive foreign investment. International
investment went to the us under the current global imbalances, which worsened the asset
market bubble and overconsumption in the us, thereby becoming ａ background of the
current crisis. More desirable form of financial globalization should direct international capital
flows much more into developing countries in need of development finance, which may need
ａ reform of the global financial system （Ｏｃａｍｐ０，2009）.
　East Asia can　play ａ key part in this, too. Since this region holds the largest foreign
reserves　as　much as 豺trillion, East Asian countries should devise ａ way to make use　of
reserves　more productive way on the basis of more financial cooperation （Ｌｅｅ，2007）.Ｔｈｅｙ
should　not　only　diversify　their reserve　holdings from dollars to other currencies, but　also
think of plans to establish institutions to help finance developing countries as　well as stabilize
the regional economy. For instance, the Asian Monetary Fund （ＡＭＦ）ｍａｙ have this func-
tion to　some　extent　and they may set up ａ　new regional development bank to encourage
development finance.　East Asian countries already achieved an agreement upon the plan to
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set up ａ multilateral fund by developing the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2009， but more close
regional economic cooperation is called on. If East Asian countries change their course of the
economic growth strategy and assist developing countries by utilizing their foreign reserves, it
will make great contributions to the correction of global imbalances　and more balanced
globalization.
V. Conclusions
　The global financial crisis after 2007 has shed light on the problematic features of unba-
lanced globalization that has several contradictions, especially global imbalances.　Growing
imbalances　in the　global economy with the huge current account deficit in the us and
foreign capital flows into the us exacerbated the asset market bubble and became one cause
of the financial crisis. The crisis from the us spread to other developed and emerging
market countries rapidly and became truly global because　financial instability in the world
economy was made highly serious by financial globalization｡
　This paper has examined the current global financial crisis and ｇｌｏｂａｌimbalances　by criti-
cally　investigating　their　developments　and　relationships　under　unbalanced　globalization.
Neoliberalism and globalization have developed after the 1980s in the world economy but
they failed to bring about stable economic growth and convergence　of countries. Neoliberal
globalization led to higher inequality within countries and more global imbalances, which
were　related with its political economy in both the us and East Asia. The real estate market
bubble and finance-led growth in the us were　stimulated not only by financial deregulation
and lax monetary policy but also by ongoing capital inflows from surplus countries. The
burst of the bubble in the end caused ａ collapse of the financial system in the us that dealt
in complex derivatives, seized with of the market fundamentalism｡
　After the global financial crisis,there has been ａ correction of global imbalances　to　a
limited extent. The us current account deficitand capital inflows to the us fell rapidly after
late 2008, however still their size and China's trade surplus are historically large. Without
structural transformation of the us and East Asia, the resolution of global imbalances is hard
to be realized. The us economy should reduce excessive spending with debts and reduce the
deficit　in　households, the government and the whole country. East Asian countries　should
change their export-dependent growth strategy to ａ domestic-demand-based growth strategy
with more　equal income distribution　and reduce recycling of dollars to the us. Many argue
that more effective financial regulation in the national and global level is necessary to prevent
future financial crisis.However, what is to be done to stabilize the global economy fun-
damentally is an　effort for more　balanced globalization to correct global imbalances.
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Notes
1) After the bankruptcy of Bear Sterns in March 2008，the fifthlargest investment bank in the
　us, the fourth largest,Lehman Brothers　and the third largestinvestment bank, Merrill Lynch,
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　went bankrupt in effect. The firstand second largest ones, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley
　had not so much exposure　to problematic subprime assets.
2）　Fortunately, there　was　no serious　move to　protectionism　after　the　global　financial　crisis.
　Although some countries introduced measures such as the 'Buy American' clause in the us, there
　is a　consensus that protectionism will ruin the global economy, different from the time of the
　Great Depression. However, it is highly likely that trade conflicts between the us and China and
　pressure to appreciate currencies of surplus countries would be seen　more frequently･
3）Ｔｈｅ identity of GDP is Ｃ十Ｓ十Ｔ＝Ｃ十I十Ｇ十（Ｘ－Ｍ）.lf we rephrase this equation, （Ｘ－Ｍ）＝
　（S－I）十(T―G). Therefore, the current account deficit could be decomposed into two parts, the
　private balance　and the government balance.　Both　balances　recorded　negative　after the　early
　2000s and aggravated the current account deficit in the us.
4）Ｎｏｂｅｌlaureates in economics and progressive economists such as Krugman　and Stiglitz, who
　criticized the Bush administration harshly and supported Obama, presented a disappointment
　about the effort for the financial reform by the Obama administration. For instance, see Krugman,
　PaulバStressing the Positive,”New York Times, ］May 7，2009, and “The Joy of Sachs,”New York
　Times, July 16， 2009, and Stiglitz, Joseph. '‘Obama's Ersatz Capitalism,”］March 31， 2009, New
　York Times.
5) The more countries join export markets, the harder it is for this strategy to be successful. Thus,
　there is ａ sort of fallacy of composition in the export-dependent growth strategy of individual
　countries when it comes to the whole world.
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